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Abstract Decision making under uncertainty has been well studied when information is considered at the associative (probabilistic) level.
The classical Theorems of von Neumann-Morgenstern and Savage provide a formal criterion for rational choice using purely associative
information. In this work, we consider decision problems in which available actions and consequences are causally connected. We define a
Causal Decision Problem and state a previous result from J. Pearl, showing that it can be considered as a causal version of the classical von
Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem. Furthermore, we consider the case when the causal mechanism that controls the environment is unknown
to the decision maker, and propose and prove a causal version of Savage’s Theorem. Then, we describe two applications for which these
theorems provide theoretical foundations: causal games and optimal action learning in causal environments. These results highlight the
importance of causal models in decision making and the variety of potential applications.
Keywords Causality · Decision Making · Game Theory
1 Introduction
Causal reasoning is a constant element in our lives as it is in human nature to constantly ask why (Spirtes et al., 2000; Pearl and Mackenzie,
2018). Looking for causes is an everyday task and, in fact, causal reasoning is to be found at the very core of our minds (Waldmann and
Hagmayer, 2013; Danks, 2014; Neil et al., 2019). It has been argued that the brain is a causal inference machine which uses effects to figure
out causes in order to engage with the world (Friston, 2010; Clark, 2015). Furthermore, acting in the world is conceived by human beings
as intervening the world and in fact humans are able to learn and use causal relations while making choices (Tversky and Kahneman, 1977,
1980; Lagnado et al., 2007; Hagmayer and Meder, 2008; Hagmayer and Sloman, 2009; Hagmayer and Fernbach, 2017).
An important aspect of acting in the world is being able to make decisions under uncertain conditions (Bernardo and Smith, 2000;
Kahneman and Tversky, 2000; Gilboa, 2009; Lake et al., 2017). Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) gave an answer for how to make
choices if rational preferences are assumed and if the decision maker knows the stochastic relation between actions and outcomes: maximize
expected utility. If no such relation is known, then Savage (1954) showed that a rational decision maker must choose as if she is maximiz-
ing expected utility using a subjective probability distribution. Such theorems provide formal criteria for decision making if rationality is
assumed.
These criteria are the basis for many techniques used in Artificial Intelligence; for example, Reinforcement Learning algorithms learn
optimal policies in such a way that any action prescribed by such optimal policy achieves the maximum expected utility (Sutton and Barto,
1998; Webb, 2007). In general, any algorithm which relies on the von Neumann-Morgenstern or Savage Theorems, such as the optimal
policies from Reinforcement Learning, is based on associative relations which are expressed using correlations or probability distributions.
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2 Mauricio Gonzalez-Soto et al.
It is a natural question how to formalize rational decision making when causal information is present; answering such question is relevant
given the importance of causal relations in everyday life. Given that human beings actually use causal information while making choices
and the importance of the associative decision making results, it is desirable to have an explicit, computationally implementable criterion
for decision making analogous to those by von Neumann-Morgenstern and Savage.
The previous question has been already considered by Nozick (1969), Lewis (1981) and by Joyce (1999) without an explicit optimality
criterion for decision making and also by Pearl (2009), who provides an optimality criterion for decision making under causal-controlled
uncertainty when the causal mechanism which controls the environment is known by the decision maker.
In this work we extend Pearl’s result to the case where a decision maker does not know the causal mechanism that controls her environ-
ment, so she holds beliefs about possible causal models and uses such beliefs as if they were true, as prescribed by Joyce (1999), in order to
attempt to make a good choice given her beliefs. We provide an explicit way of choosing an optimal decision given what the decision maker
believes about the causal structure of her environment, thus providing a causal version of Savage’s Theorem. We take a normative point of
view to study how causal relations should be used by a rational agent when making decisions with uncertain consequences. We illustrate
the application of these theoretical foundations in two domains: Causal Games and action learning in causal environments.
Game Theory deals with situations in which several rational decision makers, or players, interact while pursuing some well-defined
objective (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994); the case in which decision makers make a choice simultaneously without knowing the choice
made by the other players is called a strategic game; a well-known strategic game is the famous prisoners’ dilemma in which two detainees
must choose between confessing or remaining silent and both know the consequences of any combination of actions, what is ignored by
each player is the decision made by the other. When players ignore both the actions made by other players as well as the knowledge that
made them choose a certain action, is called a game with incomplete information, or a Bayesian Game which was introduced by Harsanyi
(1967, 1968b,a).
In this work we use the Bayesian Game model in order to study what happens when several decision makers have certain knowledge
about an environment which is controlled by some, unknown but fixed, causal mechanism. We study games in which the players actions
cause some consequence according to some unknown causal model. We apply our a rational choice criterion to formulate a Nash equilibrium
for Causal Games by defining a probability updating for Bayesian Causal Games.
Furthermore, we consider the problem of learning optimal actions in a causal environment. A decision maker is given the task of learning
an optimal action in a causal environment in which a causal model controls the relation between actions and outcomes. We consider the
case in which the causal model is unknown or partially known to the decision maker, so she has to use beliefs about possible causal models.
From the decision maker point of view, having in mind a causal model allows one to ask what would have happened if another action was
taken without actually performing the alternative action; therefore, being able of choosing the best action in terms of the probabilities of
causing a good outcome. Also, learning a causal model of a certain environment will facilitate knowledge transfer to similar domains, as the
underlying cause-effect structure has been captured and could later be used.
Our goal is to establish the foundations for decision making algorithms that rely on the existence of causal relations even though such
relations are not previously known or fully observable to a decision maker such as the algorithms found, for example, in (Bareinboim et al.,
2015; Lattimore et al., 2016; Sen et al., 2017). We provide here an implementable decision making criterion which we build over known
results from von Neumman and Morgenstern, Savage and Pearl. With our result we expect to highlight the importance and applicability of
causal relations in decision making and the wide variety of possible applications.
1.1 Motivation
Intelligent agents often face situations in which an action must be chosen in the presence of uncertain conditions; this means that an outcome
will be observed according to some probability distribution given the action chosen by the agent. In many real-world applications, the agent
doesn’t have access to all of the parameters required to calculate the maximum utility, but if the agent knew that his actions and the possible
consequences were causally related, then she could attempt to discover this relations and use them in order to predict consequences of
actions better than if he only observes multiple action-outcome pairs as done in Reinforcement Learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
It is known that human beings conceive their actions on the world as intervening in the world (Hagmayer and Sloman, 2009). Following
this idea, Lattimore et al. (2016) consider decision problems in which the action to be chosen is an intervention over a known causal graphical
model. The agent must choose the intervention that maximizes the value of a target variable after a series of learning rounds. They model
their problem as if choosing an intervention was choosing an arm of a slot machine, in which a gambler chooses an arm and gets some
reward. From the rewards they estimate probabilities and output an optimal action in the sense of obtaining minimal regret. Their work
considers that the causal model is fully known. They mention that the case in which the causal model is unknown is left as an open question,
and it is precisely what we are proposing to answer.
Many real-world applications of decision making are solved by associative methods which capture only statistical patterns that are found
in data. For example, current methods in Reinforcement Learning, and specifically in Deep Reinforcement Learning, although they have
good performance in the task that were supposed to solve, they cannot explain why a specific trajectory was chosen by the algorithm. This
is highly relevant in real-world applications, e.g. self-driving cars, where it is very important to understand why an accident happened.
For example, as told by Bornstein (2016), at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center a team of researchers tried to use Machine
Learning to predict whether pneumonia patients might develop severe complications. For this purpose they trained Neural Networks and
Decision Trees using the hospital’s own data. Neural Networks outperformed Decision Trees, but only by studying the decisions made by
the latter did the doctors find out that the algorithms instructed doctors to send home pneumonia patients who already had asthma, despite
the fact that asthma sufferers are known to be extremely vulnerable to complications. The problem relied in the training data, because the
hospital policy was to automatically send asthma sufferers with pneumonia to intensive care, and this policy worked so well that asthma
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sufferers almost never developed severe complications. It was only through the interpretability of the Decision Trees that the doctors didn’t
send asthma patients with pneumonia home to a certain death.
Methods based in Deep Neural Networks aren’t supposed to explain why a certain output was produced since those methods are based
in parallel distributed representations and the same goes for any other learning algorithm that uses Deep Neural Networks, like Deep
Reinforcement learning; when AlphaGo (Silver et al., 2017) defeated the world-champion, humanity didn’t learn anything new about the
game of Go, because the algorithm was not designed to explain its moves, although it was a very sophisticated method for achieving it.
Using only associations between variables it is not possible to infer which one is the cause and which one the effect, something extra is
required. The fundamental difference between causal and associative models is that causal models consider doing over observing (Pearl and
Mackenzie, 2018). Once a causal relation has been established between two events, performing, or intervening, over a cause allows one to
predict the outcome in a more robust way than if using only correlations between observations.
On the other hand, learning a causal model of an environment and using it to act upon the environment allows us to explain aspects of
the model that a purely associative model would not be able to explain. It allows one to ask why. Since a causal model, once it is learned,
does not depend neither on the agent nor its preferences, the gained knowledge could be easily transferred for problems of similar domain
where the use of the acquired causal relations is useful.
The impact of Causal Inference goes beyond Machine Learning and Computer Science. For example, economists are interested in
understanding what did certain public policy caused (Athey, 2017) or how human decision makers that show inconsistent preferences over
time could be oriented if the causal consequences of this inconsistent behavior is introduced into a decision-making model (Albers and
Kraft, 2016). In complex adaptive systems, causal relations can be used to clarify the complex interactions between agents in the system
(Abbott and Hadzˇikadic´, 2017) as well as for prediction and planning (Hunt et al., 2016; Brock, 2018). Our work provides the foundations
of decision making algorithms which are based on causal relations and, as will be shown, are able to learn causal models of the environment.
1.2 Main Contribution
In Section 3.1 we define Causality and state the differences between causal and associative information; having shown this, we state two
of the most important decision making results, the von Neumann-Morgenstern and Savage Theorems, which rely on purely associative
information; then, our objective is to present two analogous theorems: J. Pearl’s result, Theorem 5 which relies on a known causal model,
and our main contribution: Theorem 6, which is able to use a set of beliefs about possible causal models (i.e., a distribution) instead of a
known one.
1.3 Organization of the paper
This paper is organized as follows: first, in Section 2 we present the classical decision making theorems which use only associative informa-
tion in their formulation; then, in Section 3 a brief introduction to Causation and Causal Graphical Models is given. In Section 4 we present
previous approaches both to Causal Decision Making as well as its applications to interactive optimal action learning: causal reinforcement
learning. In Section 5 we state a von Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem for Causal Decision Making that is due to Pearl, which assumes a
known causal structure, as well as our main result, Theorem 6 which extends Pearl’s result to the case of an unknown causal structure. Finally
two applications of Theorem 6 are described. First, a causal analogue of Nash Equilibrium for games in which actions and consequences are
causally connected is defined. Then, in Section 7 we describe some optimal-action learning methods for causal environments which are able
to learn an optimal intervention under different assumptions and conditions; in particular, we describe and provide an extension for one of
such works. Finally, in Section 8 we comment on the limitations of the assumptions we consider; and in Section 9 we summarize the main
contributions of our work.
2 The Classical Decision Making Theorems: von Neumann-Morgenstern and Savage
A decision problem under uncertainty is the mathematical model of a situation in which an agent must choose one out of many available
actions with uncertain consequences which depend on different, possibly unknown, factors. Such consequences are ordered in terms of the
satisfaction that they produce in the decision maker, and such ordering is represented by a preference relation denoted by , where a b is
read as a being preferred to b.
The most well-known theories for Decision Making are those from Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and Savage (1954). In the
former theory it is assumed that the decision maker knows the stochastic relation between actions and consequences, which is also known
as decision under risk, and in that case the theory guarantees that the decision maker behaves as if she maximizes the expected value of a
utility function. If the decision maker doesn’t know the probabilities of observing an outcome given a chosen action, then Savage’s theory
guarantees that the decision maker behaves as if she has in mind a subjective probability distribution and a utility function and chooses the
action which maximizes the expected utility with respect to that subjective probability distribution and the utility function, this is known in
the literature as decision under uncertainty.
Other Decision Making theories exist, such as Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), Gilboa’s
Case-Based Decision Theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1995), among others that are out of the scope of this work. In Section 4.1 we make
reference to another theory, Joyce’s Causal Decision Making (Joyce, 1999). For further details on classical (non-causal) decision making,
see Bernardo and Smith (2000) and Gilboa (2009).
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2.1 Von Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) had the objective of justifying strategies in which players in a game maximized their expected utility.
This theorem considers a scenario of decision under risk and rational preferences; this is, choosing between uncertain outcomes with known
probabilities.
Formally, using the notation from Gilboa (2009), we consider a set X of alternatives. Let L be the set of lotteries with finite support over
X . The object of choice are the elements l ∈ L that are known to the decision maker; we represent the decision maker’s preferences by a
preference relation⊆ L×L that satisfies being complete, transitive, continuous and a technical condition called independence. This family
of conditions is called von Neumann-Morgenstern rationality axioms as described in Gilboa (2009).
Theorem 1 (von Neumann-Morgenstern) A preference relation ⊆ L×L where L is a set of lotteries with finite support over a set X
satisfies the von Neumann-Morgenstern rationality axioms if and only if there exists a function u : X → R such that for every P,Q ∈ L we
have that
P Q if and only if ∑
x∈X
P(x)u(x)≥ ∑
x∈X
Q(x)u(x). (1)
The theorem states that if a rational decision maker knows the probabilities of obtaining a certain outcome, then she must choose as if
maximizing the expected value of some function u whose existence is guaranteed by Theorem 1. See Gilboa (2009) for details on the proof.
2.2 Savage’s Theorem
If a rational decision maker does not know the probabilities of obtaining certain outcomes and does not have a precise, objective quantifi-
cation of her preferences (utility function), then it is Savage’s Theorem (Savage, 1954), which gives a formal choosing criterion. Savage’s
result extends von Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem since it considers the case in which a rational decision maker does not know neither
her utility function nor the probabilities to be used in order to obtain the expected values required for making choices according to the von
Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem. The notation and setting we use here is the one used by Bernardo and Smith (2000). Consider a set Ω .
Consider a countable set A of available actions; for each action ai ∈A , a partition Ei of Ω and a set of consequences Ci. Let E the union
of every Ei, we assume E to be a σ -algebra of events, and C the union of all Ci.
Definition 1 An uncertain environment is the tuple (Ω ,A ,C ,E ). WhereA is a non-empty set of available actions, C a set of consequences
and E an algebra of events over Ω .
When we consider the preferences of some decision maker over the set of consequences of some uncertain environment we have a
Decision Problem under Uncertainty, Bernardo and Smith (2000):
Definition 2 A Decision Problem under Uncertainty is an uncertain environment (Ω ,A ,C ,E ) plus a preference relation  defined over C
Definition 3 A Decision Problem under Uncertainty is said to be bounded if there exists a pair of consequences c∗ and c∗ such that for
every c ∈ C , c∗  c c∗
Definition 4 A Decision Problem under Uncertainty is said to be finite if the set A of available actions is finite.
Bernardo and Smith (2000) derive the existence of a subjective probability measure from a set of rationality axioms, where a decision
maker has some mechanism of quantifying uncertainty in terms of real numbers within the [0,1] interval, and then the classical Kolmogorov
axioms are derived from such construction, and therefore all of the known machinery of Probability Theory. We now state Savage’s Theorem.
Details can be found in (Kreps, 1988; Bernardo and Smith, 2000; Gilboa, 2009).
Theorem 2 (Savage) In a finite, bounded Decision Problem under Uncertainty (A ,C ,E ,), the preference relation satisfies the Savage
rationality axioms if and only if there exists:
– A probability measure P, called a subjective probability, that associates with each uncertain event E ∈ E a real number P(E).
– A utility function u : C → R such that it associates each consequence with a real number u(c).
Such that for a1 and a2 actions in A ,
a1  a2
if and only if
EP[u(a1)]≥ EP[u(a2)],
where EP[u(a)] is given by ∑ j∈J u(c j)P(E j) since any action a can be identified as {c j|E j; j ∈ J}. Details in Section 2.5.2 from Bernardo
and Smith (2000).
Proof Proposition 2.22 in Bernardo and Smith (2000).
This theorem states that if a rational decision maker does not know the precise probabilities of outcomes given that an action is taken, then
she chooses as if having in mind a probability assignment to the uncertainties in her environment and using such probabilities to calculate
the expected utility with respect to a subjective utility function that represents her preferences. This result also gives a precise definition
of subjective probability as a quantification of uncertainty which is used to make good decisions. See Hens (1992) and Gilboa (2009) for
further details. See Ellsberg (1961) and Binmore (2008) for critiques of the Savage axioms.
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2.3 Limitations of the Theorems
The mentioned theorems have the limitations of relying only on associative information; this is, on correlations and patterns found in data
rather than strong causal relations. For example, as mentioned by Pearl (2009), using only associative information one would be tempted
to stop going to the doctor in order to stop being diagnosed as sick. On the other hand, our results provide an easy to implement way of
making choices using causal relations and beliefs about such relations as used by humans. Human beings know (this is, use causal relations)
that going to the physician does not cause being sick and this is what Pearl calls commonsensical decision making. Also, as we will mention
later in the paper, associative information lacks an ordering thus failing to determine if X is performed, then Y will be caused.
Formally, in this paper we consider the actions chosen by a decision maker as an interventions over a causal graphical model; this is, in
the classical von Neumann-Morgenstern and Savage Theorems, once a decision maker chooses an action a, the observed consequence has
a probability P(c|a); if causal information is considered, then the probability of a certain consequence is P(c|do(a)). In the next section we
state some basic facts on causality and why P(·|x) is different from P(·|do(x)) for some value x.
3 Causal Decision Problems
3.1 On causality
The concept of Causality deals with regularities found in a given environment which are stronger than probabilistic (or associative) relations
in the sense that a causal relation allows for evaluating a change in the consequence given that a change in the cause is performed. The ma-
nipulationist interpretation of Causality (details in Woodward (2003)) is adopted here. The main paradigm is clearly expressed by Campbell
and Cook (1979) as manipulation of a cause will result in a manipulation of the effect. Consider the following example from Woodward
(2003): manually forcing a barometer to go down won’t cause a storm, whereas the occurrence of a storm will cause the barometer to go
down.
We know from Granger (1969) and Lamport (1978) that there are two sufficient and necessary conditions for causality: a context and an
order. We will adopt here the formal definition of Causality given by Spirtes et al. (2000); i.e., a stochastic relation between events which
is irreflexive, antisymmetric and transitive. Similar descriptions of the manipulationist approach can be found in Holland (1986). Causal
inference tools, such as Pearl’s do-calculus (Pearl, 2009) allow to find the effect of an intervention in terms of probabilistic information
when certain conditions are met. For what remains, we assume the causal axioms found in (Spirtes et al., 2000) as well as the condition
known as causal sufficiency (Pearl, 2009).
3.2 A definition of Causality
The formal definition of Causality that will be adopted in this work is the definition provided by Spirtes et al. (2000) which states that
causation is a stochastic relation between events in a probability space; this is, some event (or events) causes another event to occurr.
Definition 5 Let (Ω ,F ,P) a finite probability space, and consider a binary relation→⊆F ×F which is:
– Transitive: If A→ B and B→C for any A,B,C ∈F then A→C.
– Irreflexive: For all A ∈F it doesn’t hold that A→ A.
– Antisymmetric: For A,B ∈F such that A 6= B if A→ B then it doesn’t hold that B→ A.
We say that A is a cause of B (or that A causes B, A is the cause and B is the effect) if A→ B. It is important to note that an event may have
more than one cause, and that not necessarily each one of this causes is sufficient to produce the effect.
We assume that for any event A ∈F there are no causes lying outside F (causal sufficiency). It is also be assumed that the relations
expressed by → are the only causal relations in the environment. This assumption can be interpreted as not allowing intermediate events
between events known to be causally related. For example, if in our space we have that striking a match causes fire, we do not allow into
consideration the underlying chemical reactions that cause fire from friction. In this sense, we say that striking a match is a direct cause of
fire and this are the only causes considered herein (Spirtes et al., 2000).
3.3 Representation into a Directed Acyclic Graph
The causal relations contained in→ can be summarized in a graph G = (V,E) in the following way: If A→ B then the graph must contain
a node A ∈V representing A, a node B ∈V representing B and a directed edge e ∈ E connecting the respective nodes in the direction of the
causal relation.
Proposition 1 Given a causal relation→ as in Definition 5 then the graph that is obtained by considering nodes for events and edges for
the causal relations as previously described is a Directed Acyclic Graph.
Proof The graph is directed since the definition of causality imposes a direction between events; namely, a direction between the cause and
the effect. To see that the graph is acyclic, suppose that a cycle A→ B→C→ A exists, this would imply, because of transitivity, that A→ A,
which cannot be since the relation is irreflexive.
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Notice that since the graph is finite, there exist some nodes that do not have causes, which are called exogenous. If an event A is caused
by some other event, then we say it is endogenous and we denote the set of its causes as Pa(A). It is proven in Kiiveri et al. (1984) that at
least one exogenous node exists in a causal graph.
3.3.1 Relations between a causal graph and probabilities
Given a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) it is possible to obtain a probability measure that expresses the conditional independence relations
that are expressed in the graph (Koller and Friedman, 2009), which we will call PG . For the DAG built from the causal relations, we require
that its correspondent PG satisfies the following conditions (Spirtes et al., 2000):
– Markov Causality: an event V (or node in G ) is independent of every other event A such that A isn’t either a cause nor an effect of V
given the causes of V .
– Causal Minimality: No proper sub-graph of G satisfies the Markov Causality condition.
– Causal Faithfulness: The Markov Causal condition contains all of the conditional independence statements expressed by the DAG G .
Also, we consider an extra pair of conditions. The first one, known as Causal Sufficiency, is about the nature of the model: for any
variable X in the model G there are no causes of X outside of the model G (Spirtes et al., 2000; Pearl, 2009; Sucar, 2015). The second
required condition is that the causal mechanism remains unchanged after interventions, this is called in (Woodward, 2003) as invariantness,
this basically means that an intervention does not break the causal mechanism when intervening upon it. These conditions are required in
an axiomatic fashion so they will be taken as they are without questioning.
3.4 Causal Graphical Models
A Causal Graphical Model (CGM) consists of a set of random variables X = {X1, ...,Xn}, and a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) whose
nodes are in correspondence with the variables in X and whose edges represent relations of cause-effect. Also, the model, which up to
this point is nothing more than a Bayesian Network with causal semantics, is enriched with an operator named do() which is defined over
graphs and whose action is described as follows: given X ⊆X and x = {xi1 ,xi2 , ...,xi j} ∈ Val(X ) the action do(X = x) corresponds to
assign to each X j ∈ X the value xxi j and to delete every incoming edges into the node corresponding to each X j in the graph G (Pearl, 2009;
Koller and Friedman, 2009; Sucar, 2015). To apply the do() operator over a variable (or set of variables) is also called as an intervention
over the variable. It is this interventional operator which separates associative models from causal models, since it provides the solution of
the “probability raising” attempts to define causality, since if X is a cause for Y then P(Y |do(X)) > P(Y ) (Pearl and Mackenzie, 2018). In
fact, using the Do operator we give a definition of a variable X causing Y .
Definition 6 Let G a Causal Graphical Model and PG its corresponding distribution and let X and Y variables in the model. We say that X
causes Y if
PG (Y |do(X = x) 6= PG (Y |do(X = x′).
It is required that the probability distribution that results from an intervention over a variable is Markov compatible with the graph; this is,
the resulting interventional distribution is equivalent to the product of the conditional probability of every variable given its parents in the
intervened graph (Sucar, 2015).
3.4.1 The identifiability problem
Under what conditions can causal inquiries be answered in terms of purely observational data? It is known that if the Markov Causal
condition and Causal Faithfulness hold, then it is possible to identify the causal graph up to related variables without direction (Markov
equivalence) (Peters et al., 2012; Mooij et al., 2016).
3.4.2 Do-Calculus
The Do-Calculus is a set of rules for manipulating probabilistic statements that involve interventions and, under certain conditions, allow
them to be transformed into statements that do not involve interventional data (Pearl, 1995, 2009).
It is important to introduce some notation. Consider a causal graphical model G and X ,Y,Z disjoint sets of nodes of G . We denote by GX¯
the graph that is obtained by deleting from G all of the edges that enter nodes in X . In the same way, GX is the graph obtained by deleting
the edges that emerge from X . Finally, GZX¯ is the graph obtained by deleting edges incoming into X and outgoing from Z.
Theorem 3 (Do-Calculus, Pearl (2009)) Let G a CGM and PG the probability measure induced by the model; then, for disjoint sets of
nodes X ,Y,Z,W it holds:
– If for the graph GX¯ it holds that Y is conditionally independent from Z given X and W, then
PG (Y = y|do(X = x),Z = z,W = w) = PG (Y = y|do(X = x),W = w).
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– If for the graph GX¯Z it holds that Y is conditionally independent from Z given X and W, then
P(Y = y|do(X = x),do(Z = z),W = w) = P(Y = y|do(X = x),Z = z,W = w).
– Let Z(W ) the set of nodes in Z that aren’t ancestors of any node in W in the graph GX¯ . If Y is conditionally independent from Z given X
and W in the graph GX¯ , ¯Z(W ), then
P(Y = y|do(X = x),do(Z = z),W = w) = P(Y = y|do(X = x),W = w).
Proof See Pearl (2009).
Theorem 4 (Properties of Do-calculus) Peters et al. (2017)
The following statements hold:
– The Do-Calculus is complete; this is, sufficient for deriving every identifiable interventional distribution (Huang and Valtorta, 2006;
Shpitser and Pearl, 2006).
– There exists an algorithm capable of finding all of the identifiable interventions (Tian, 2002; Huang and Valtorta, 2006).
– A necessary and sufficient criteria exists for the identifiability of interventional distributions (Shpitser and Pearl, 2006; Huang and
Valtorta, 2006).
Proof See Peters et al. (2017).
The Do-Calculus rules provide a solution for the identifiability problem:
Corollary 1 Pearl (2009).
A distribution q = P(y1, ...,yk|do(x1), ...,do(xn)) is identifiable in a causal graphical model G if there exists a finite sequence of transfor-
mations, where each one of them corresponds to any of the rules of the Do-Calculus, that reduce q to a purely observational expression.
3.5 Further limitations of associative information
As we have said, one of the fundamental aspects of Causality is the presence of an order and a context; the latter of such elements not being
present in associative information; this is, consider a distribution p(a, t), which we can factorize in the two following ways:
p(a, t) = p(a|t)p(t) (2)
and
p(a, t) = p(t|a)p(a) (3)
which can be represented indistinguishably as Bayesian Networks as a→ t or as t → a. This situation does not happen while considering
causal relations.
Also, we recall the difference between an observation and an intervention: p(x|y) 6= p(x|do(y)). If this was not the case, then correlation
would equal causation which can be shown in a variety of examples to be false.
3.6 Causal Environments and Causal Decision Problems
We consider decision making with causal information. We define a Causal Environment to be an uncertain environment such that there
exists a Causal Graphical Model (CGM) G (Koller and Friedman, 2009) which controls the environment; this is, there exists a causal
relation between available actions and consequences in the sense that any chosen action will stochastically cause a consequence. The role
of the CGM is to encode all of the causal relations present in the environment, not only between actions and consequences but also between
any other variables in the environment.
Definition 7 A Causal Environment is a tuple (Ω ,A ,G ,C ,E ) where (Ω ,A ,C ,E ) is an uncertain environment and G is a CGM such that
the set of variables of G correspond to the uncertain events in E .
Definition 8 We define a Causal Decision Problem (CDP) as a tuple (Ω ,A ,G ,E ,C ,) where (Ω ,A ,G ,E ,C ) is a Causal Environment
and  is a preference relation.
For the CGM in a CDP we distinguish two particular variables: one corresponding to the available actions, and one corresponding to the
produced (caused) outcome. We are considering that only one variable can be intervened upon and that the values of such variable represent
the actions available to the decision maker; i.e., the value forced upon such variable under an intervention represents the action taken by the
decision maker. The intuition behind the definition of a Causal Decision Problem is this: a decision maker chooses an action a ∈A , which
is automatically inputed into the model G , which outputs the causal outcome c ∈ C . We say a CDP is finite if the set A is finite.
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4 Related Work
4.1 Causal Decision Making and Decision-Theoretic foundations of Causal Inference
A previous attempt to formalize Decision Theory in the presence of Causal Information was given by Lewis (1981); Joyce (1999). According
to such formulation, a decision maker must choose whatever action is more likely to (causally) produce a desired outcome while keeping
any beliefs about causal relations fixed. This is stated by the Stalnaker equation (Stalnaker, 1968))
u(a) =∑
x
P(a→ x)u(x), (4)
where a→ x is to be read as if the decision maker does a then x would be the case (Gibbard and Harper, 1978; Kleinberg, 2013). Lewis’
and Joyce’s work captured the intuition that causal relations may be used to control the environment and to predict what is caused by the
actions of a decision maker. In Section 5.2 we will refine the → operator by an explicit way of calculating the probability of causing an
outcome by doing a certain action in terms of Pearl’s do-calculus.
Heckerman and Shachter (1995) provide a framework for defining the notions of cause and effect in terms of decision theoretical
concepts, such as states and outcomes and gives a theoretical basis for graphical description of causes and effects, such as the causal
influence diagrams from (Dawid, 2002). Heckerman gave an elegant definition of causality, but did not address how to actually make
choices using causal information.
Dawid (2012) presented a decision-theoretic approach to causal inference in which a decision maker must take into account how al-
ternatives compare against the other in terms of the average causal effect, such approach uses the well-known influence diagrams (Dawid,
2002, 2003) in order to derive formulas that allow an explicit calculation of the average causal effect. Influence diagrams have the ability of
expressing both intervention variables and chance variables into a single graphical structure in such a way that the standard techniques for
probabilistic DAG’s still apply. An optimality criterion for sequential interventions is obtained by Dawid and Didelez (2008) by maximizing
the expectation of outcomes.
4.2 Causal Reinforcement Learning and Bandit Problems
Reinforcement Learning is a general framework for interactive learning in which an agent performs an action and receives some feedback
from his environment. The classical setting for an agent to learn by interaction is that of a Markov Decision Process, in which at time t an
agent is situated in state st and takes an action at , he then observes a new state st+1 and a reward signal rt+1. The objective is to find the
policy which maximizes the long-run reward. It can be shown that this is equivalent to solving the Bellman Equations (Sutton and Barto,
1998), and that the actions prescribed by such optimal policy maximize the expected utility. This shows the connection between the modern
field of Reinforcement Learning and classical results in Decision Theory which justify choosing actions that maximize expected utility when
certain rationality assumptions are made.
It has been recently studied the connection between Reinforcement Learning and Causation in a series of papers by Gershman (2015),
Lattimore et al. (2016), Bareinboim et al. (2015) among others such as (Zhang and Bareinboim, 2016, 2017; Lee and Bareinboim, 2019;
Correa and Bareinboim, 2019; Zhang and Bareinboim, 2019). Even though the connection between Reinforcement Learning and causal rea-
soning is intuitive, a proper framework for Reinforcement Learning based on Causal Decision Making (see Joyce (1999) for an introduction
to Causal Decision Making and Pearl (2009) for a more recent computational version) has not been explored.
A similar setting, in which the actions available to a decision maker are interventions over a causal model has been analyzed by Lattimore
et al. (2016) as a bandit problem, where the optimal action must be learned over T rounds of action-observation in which only one action
can be chosen. This work assumes that the conditional probabilities are known, later this restriction is relaxed by Sen et al. (2017).
In a classic bandit problem an agent chooses an arm from a slot machine, observes a reward and then moves on to the next machine
which is of the same kind and whose initial settings are independent of the previous machine and action (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Several
algorithms exists for finding the best arm in a multi-arm bandit, such as those described in Bubeck et al. (2009); Audibert and Bubeck
(2010); Gabillon et al. (2012); Agarwal et al. (2014); Jamieson et al. (2014); Jamieson and Nowak (2014); Chen and Li (2015); Carpentier
and Locatelli (2016); Russo (2016); Kaufmann et al. (2016), but none of these works consider causal-governed environments. Ortega
and Braun (2014) gives results on sequential decision-making using Generalized Thompson Sampling that could be extended into causal
inference problems. The aforementioned papers assume the causal model is known to the decision makers so their work focuses on using
causal information to make good choices, but the problem of acquiring this causal knowledge is left unattacked.
In this paper we present a causal decision making criterion useful when the probabilities that hold in an environment are not previously
known to the decision maker, which is usually the case in Reinforcement Learning. Therefore, the findings of this paper can have an important
impact into decision making because of both, the importance of causal relations in artificial intelligence and the realistic assumption of an
agent not having full information of her environment.
5 Causal Decision Making: Main Results
5.1 A von Neumann-Morgenstern type theorem for causal environments
Consider a rational decision maker who faces a causal environment in which she knows the causal model controlling the relation between
actions and outcomes. She can use the known causal model in order to find the probabilities of causing a desired outcome given she takes a
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certain action. The following theorem is found in Section 4.1 of Pearl (2009), but the intuitions that lie behind can be traced back to Lewis
(1981) and Joyce (1999).
Consider a Causal Model G and its associated distribution PG and let C be the set of consequences of interest for a decision maker. Then,
Theorem 5 (Causal von Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem, Pearl (2009)) If a rational decision maker faces a Causal Environment and
if the causal model is known, then the preference relation  satisfies the von Neumann-Morgenstern rationality axioms if and only if:
a b
if and only if
∑c∈C P(c|do(a))u(c)≥ ∑c∈C P(c|do(b))u(c).
Equivalently, the action that must be chosen is
a∗ = argmaxa∈A ∑
c∈C
P(c|do(a))u(c). (5)
Proof This Theorem assumes the existence of a Causal Graphical Model known by the decision maker; then, by Theorem 1, we know that
the action that must be chosen is the one that maximizes the expected utility; we must now ask the expected utility of what? The answer lies
on the Causal Graphical Model which controls the relation between actions and consequences; if this is the case, then the probability of a
consequence given an action a is in fact P(c|do(a)). The rest follows by Theorem 1. Details in Section 4.1 of Pearl (2009).
As shown in the proof of Theorem 5, we claim that Pearl’s result can be considered as a causal version of the von Neumann-Morgenstern
result since it assumes that a causal model is known. If the causal model that controls an environment is known to a decision maker, then this
is equivalent of being able to know the probabilities of outcomes given actions. As stated in Section 4.1 of Pearl (2009), the utility function u
is considered as given, even though the Theorem 1 guarantees its existence. Pearl argues that decision making by maximizing such function
is commonsensical without appealing to the original results in rational decision making. We avoid entering in the long-standing debate
between causal and evidential decision making. We only note that both von Neumann-Morgenstern’s and Savage’s Theorems have no a
priori causal interpretation and therefore rely on associative information.
5.2 A Savage Theorem for causal environments
When the decision maker does not know the causal model which controls her environment we argue that the decision maker is facing a
particular case of Savage’s Theorem. The difference here being that the subjective probability must make use of the causal nature of the
environment. The idea we will follow is that Savage’s Theorem gives the decision maker a subjective quantification of her uncertainty about
the environment and the associated probabilities which must be used as if they were true.
In this case, where a Causal Graphical Model controls the relation between actions and outcomes, such subjective information about the
environment must consider such causal structures. For this reason, we assert that the probability distribution that the decision maker has in
mind is in fact a distribution over causal structures where the decision maker uses each structure as if it were the true one in order to choose
the best action within each structure by using Pearl’s result. We assume a finite set of actions and outcomes. Formally:
Theorem 6 (Causal Savage Theorem) In a finite, bounded Causal Decision Problem (A ,G ,E ,C ,), where G is a Causal Graphical
Model, we have that the preferences  of a decision maker are Savage-rational if and only if there exists a probability distribution PC over
a familyF of causal structures such that for a,b ∈A :
a b
if and only if
∑c∈C u(c)
(
∑g∈F Pg(c|do(a))PC(g)
)
≥
∑c∈C u(c)
(
∑g∈F Pg(c|do(b))PC(g)
)
where Pg is the probability distribution associated with the causal structure g.
Proof The decision maker is facing an environment in which any action she takes will stochastically cause an outcome c ∈ C . For this
reason, the decision making is facing a very particular case of decision making under uncertainty. Assuming Savage-rationality, by Theorem
2 we obtain a utility function uS and a probability measure PS which satisfy that the preference relation is represented by the expectation of
uS with respect to PS.
In such a causal environment, the CGM G contains all of the information which connects actions, uncertain events and outcomes, and
noting that we can identify any action a with {c j|E j : j ∈ J} where J a countable set of indexes (Bernardo and Smith (2000)) we have that:
EPS [u(c)] =∑
j∈J
u(c j)PS(E j).
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For each action a= {c j|E j : j ∈ J}, PS(E j) is the probability of causing consequence c j by choosing action a. In order for the decision maker
to find the probability of a certain consequence c j given that an action a is performed then she must have in mind a single causal model g and
a way to assign probabilities over a family of causal models; i.e., the uncertainty component PS(E j) is formed by two parts: a distribution
PC which represents the degree of belief of the decision maker about a specific model g being the true one, and within g, a distribution Pg
used to calculate the probability of causing some consequence c j given that action a is chosen. Using the Caratheodory Extension Theorem
(Ash and Doleans-Dade, 2000), a probability measure PC whose support is a sufficiently general family of causal models F can be shown
to exist. For g ∈F , the decision maker considers g to be the true causal model with probability PC(g) and will use Theorem 5 in order to
find the best action within the causal graphical model g as if it were the true one. Let Pg the probability distribution associated with g.
Then:
EPS [u(c)] = ∑
j∈J
u(c j)PS(E j)
= ∑
j∈J
u(c j)
(
∑
g∈F
Pg(c j|do(a))PC(g)
)
.
We have shown what is the expected utility for some action a ∈A , and again by Theorem 2 the result follows.
5.3 Interpretation
Theorem 6 says that a decision maker who faces a Causal Decision Problem is considering a probability distribution PC over a family F
and, within each structure, using the term Pg(c|do(a)) in order to find the probability of obtaining a certain consequence given that the
intervention do(a) is performed; in this way, the optimal action a∗ is given by:
a∗ = argmax a∈A ∑
c∈C
u(c)
(
∑
g∈F
Pg(c|do(a))PC(g)
)
. (6)
We note that a∗ is obtained by taking into account the utility obtained by every possible consequences weighted using both the probability
of causing such action within a specific causal model g and the probability that the decision maker assign to such g ∈F .
We are considering a normative interpretation for Theorem 6 according to which a decision maker must use any causal information in
order to obtain the best possible action. Such action must be obtained by considering the beliefs of the decision maker about the causal
relations that hold in her environment (the distribution PC), how such relations could produce the best action when considered as if they
were true (distribution Pg), and the satisfaction (utility u) produced by the consequences of actions.
Humans tend to ignore pure probabilistic information over causal information (Tversky and Kahneman, 1980), and in fact are able to
learn, and use, causal models in sequential decision making processes (Lagnado et al., 2007; Sloman and Hagmayer, 2006; Nichols and
Danks, 2007; Meder et al., 2010; Hagmayer and Meder, 2013; Wellen and Danks, 2012), even though such learning is not perfect (Rottman
and Hastie, 2014). Therefore, this theorem provides the basis for a much stronger, and computationally implementable, framework for
decision making in which causal information is preferred over associative information, even though complete causal information may not
be available to the decision maker.
6 Application: Causal Games and Nash Equilibrium
In this section we know consider an application in the domain of game theory: we consider a strategic game between N rational players
who are situated in a causal environment. We explore the implications of causal decision making in game theory given the importance of
multi-agent systems for computational intelligence. With this contribution we expect to show that standard notions of game theory such as
Nash Equilibrium can be extended to the case in which causal information is considered over associative information. Therefore, provide
motivation to further extend classical results, which have been shown useful, to use causal information as a basis.
A game is a model of a situation in which several players must take an action and afterwards they will be affected both by the outcome
of their own action as well as the actions of the other players (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994). In a strategic game it is assumed that no
player knows the action taken by any other players; we also assume that the causal mechanism, which represented by a Causal Graphical
Model G , remains fixed and it is unknown for each player.
In this game, players ignore the actions taken by any other player, and since the causal model which controls the environment is unknown
by every player, the players also ignore the information that players will use in order to take their respective actions: strategic games of this
type are called Bayesian Games, introduced by Harsanyi (Harsanyi, 1967, 1968b,a). In the games we will consider, the uncertainty of every
player consists of two levels: on a first level, the true causal model G ; on a second level, what an action do(a) causes if a certain Causal
Graphical Model ω is considered to be the causal model.
Definition 9 A Bayesian strategic game(Osborne and Rubinstein (1994)), consists of:
– A finite set N of players.
– A finite set Ω of states of nature.
– For each player, a nonempty set Ai of actions.
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– For each player, a finite set Ti and a function τi : Ω 7→ Ti the signal function of the player
– For each player, a probability measure pi over Ω such that pi(τ−1i (ti))> 0 for all ti ∈ Ti.
– A preference relation i defined over the set of probability measures over A×Ω where A = A1×·· ·An
We will consider Ω to be a family of admissible causal models; in this way, ω ∈ Ω being the true state of nature fixes a causal model
which controls the environment in which the players make their choices. In classical Bayesian games, once ω ∈ Ω is realized as the true
state, then each player receives a signal ti = τi(ω) and the posterior belief pi(ω|τ−1i (ti)) given by pi(ω)/pi(τ−1i (ti)) if ω ∈ τ−1i (ti). In the
case for causal bayesian games, we must consider both the probability pi of ω being the true state as well as the probability pωi of observing
a certain consequence when doing some action ai if ω is the true model.
Following Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), we define a new game G∗ in which its players are all of the possible combinations (i, ti) ∈
N×Ti, where the possible actions for (i,Ti) is Ai. We see that fixing a player i ∈ N, the posterior probability p(ω|τ−1i (ti)) induces a lottery
over the pairs (a∗( j,τ j(ω))) j,ω) for some other j ∈ N. This lottery assigns to (a∗( j,τ j(ω))) j,ω) the probability pi(ω)/pi(τ−1i (ti)) if
ω ∈ τ−1i (ti). The classical Bayesian game will simply call a Nash equilibrium for the game G∗ a Nash equilibrium of the original game; but
we have the second level of uncertainty: the consequences caused by some action a through a causal model ω . We notice that the posterior
probability itself induces a probability distribution defined over actions for each player once a desired consequence is fixed, this distribution,
according to Theorem 6 is given by pωi (c|do(a∗i ),a∗−i)pi(ω|τ−1i (ti)). This motivates the following definition of a Causal Nash equilibrium.
6.1 Causal Nash Equilibrium
For each player i ∈ N in the strategic game, we define the following probability distribution over consequences:
pai (c) = p
ω
i (c|do(ai),a−i)pi(ω) for a ∈ A = A1×·· ·×AN . (7)
where pωi is the probability of causing a certain consequence within a causal structure ω and pi are the player’s posterior beliefs about the
causal structure that controls the environment, and do() is the well known intervention operator from Pearl (2009). We now define:
uCi (a) = ∑
c∈C
ui(c)pai (c) for a ∈ A = A1×·· ·×AN . (8)
Notice that uCi evaluates an action profile a ∈ A in terms of: The knowledge about the causal structure of each player represented by pi,
which allows each player to evaluate the probability of causing outcomes in terms of actions by using the do operator as well as the other
actions taken by the other players, given by a−i and the preferences of each player ui. Using this new function, we define the equilibria for
a strategic game with causal information and Bayesian players as:
Definition 10 A Nash equilibrium for this causal strategic game is an action profile a∗ ∈ A if and only if
uCi (a
∗)≥ uCi (ai,a∗−i) for any other ai ∈ Ai. (9)
This is, an action profile is a Nash equilibrium if and only if each player uses her current knowledge about the causal structure of the
environment in order to (causally) produce the best possible outcome given the actions taken by the other players. The existence of the
Causal Nash Equilibrium is guaranteed if every Ai is a nonempty compact convex set in some Rn and if the preference relation induced by
uCi is continuous and quasi-concave.
7 Application: Formalizing an optimal action learning method for causal environments
In recent papers by Lattimore et al. (2016); Sen et al. (2017) and Gonzalez-Soto et al. (2018), a decision maker is given the task to learn
an optimal action from a series of learning rounds in a causal environment when the true causal model which controls the environment
is unknown for the decision maker. Lattimore et al. (2016) assume that the conditional distributions for each variable given its parents is
known, while Sen et al. (2017) assume as known only a part of the causal graphical model and allows for interventions in the unknown part
of the model. Gonzalez-Soto et al. (2018) assume that the graphical structure of such model is known. In their method, the decision maker
holds beliefs about the parameters of the model, which are used in order to build a causal model that is used as if it were the true one in
order to obtain the best action in each round.
Gonzalez-Soto et al. (2018), assume that the graphical structure of the causal model is known and use a Dirichlet distribution in order to
sample the Conditional Probability Tables required to fully specify a Causal Graphical Model; once such model is specified the authors use
an expression derived from Pearl’s do-calculus in order to find a best action; the best action is defined in terms of the maximum expected
utility as required by both the von Neumann-Morgenstern and Savage Theorems. Their method fits within our Theorem 6 because in this
paper the distribution PC(g) is a distribution over causal models with the same structure, and when a model is specified from PC, it is then
used as if it were the true one in order to find the best action for such causal model. In the above mentioned paper, the possible outcomes
are only 1 and 0, so once a model g is sampled, the product u(c)Pg(c|do(a)) simply becomes P(C = 1|do(a)) which is stated only as an
intuitive solution in the mentioned paper.
Such learning method, which has been shown to fit in our causal decision making theorem achieves a similar performance than the
classical Q-Learning algorithm with the extra of learning a causal model of a very simple environment. Learning a causal model of the
environment allows to extract high-level insights of a phenomena beyond associative descriptions of what is observed. A causal model is
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able to explain why a particular decision was made since it allows to extract the causes and effects of an agent’s actions. Once a causal
model is acquired, an external user is able to reason about what...if... statements that associative methods cannot answer.
When a decision maker chooses an action out of many, a causal model allows to ask what would’ve happened if another action was
taken without actually performing the alternative action. It is important to be careful when using the word explanation since it allows for
several uses in language, here we understand explanation as used by Woodward (2003) who considers explanations where what is explained
depends on other factors via some relationship that holds as a matter of empirical fact rather than logical reasons. Also, learning a causal
model of a certain environment would allow transferability of knowledge into similar domains because the underlying cause-effect structure
has been captured and could later be used. We have provided the extension to the causal case of the formal criteria (expected utility) to be
used when a causal model is present in the environment, and therefore we hope that our result will be of interest to anyone using decision
making under uncertainty.
7.1 A random graph approach to causal structure learning
For the sake of completeness, we now provide a relaxation of the restriction found in Gonzalez-Soto et al. (2018); in such work, it is required
that the graphical structure of the causal model is known, which is a strong assumption.
Human beings focus on local aspects while learning causal relations which are later unified into a single structure (Fernbach and Sloman
(2009), Waldmann et al. (2008), Danks (2014)). Following this idea, Wellen and Danks (2012) propose a model to explain how observations
and interventions are used by human beings to learn causal relations in terms of a local prediction-error learning. Following this line of
thought, we propose here a local probabilistic encoding of the uncertainty that a decision maker has over the existence or not of causal
relations between variables.
Such assumption is to be relaxed to the case in which the graphical structure of the causal model is unknown, but the variables of the
model are known; also, we assume the decision maker has an ordering according to which if A B, then B can not cause A. Our extension
will make use both of Theorem 6, random graphs and the as if intuition present in this paper.
We call our method local since we use the uncertainty (from the agent’s point of view) about the existence of a causal relation between
pairs of variables, which are local components of the structure of a graph. Such uncertainty is to be updated in terms of what is observed
from realizations of the true causal mechanism that controls the environment. Since observations alone do not suffice to uniquely determine
a DAG, we make use of a partial ordering between the variables in the model that, at least in principle, can not be a cause of each other. This
ordering must be an input product from expert knowledge.
Let a rational agent consider the following set of variables X = {X1, ...,Xn} which are causally related, even though the agent does
not now how; the agent knows that she can only intervene one variable, and does so in order to alter the value of some identified reward
variable; without loss of generality assume that the agent can only intervene on X1 wishing to affect Xn. Let pi j be the belief that the agent
has over a causal relation (directed link) existing between variable with index i and variable with index j. Let G an initial random DAG
formed as follows: node set is N = {1, ...,n} and a link exists between i and j with probability pi j. Now, we use the methodology found in
Gonzalez-Soto et al. (2018) as well as our Theorem 6 in order to find the best action a∗ for the obtained graph G. The best action is taken,
and a full realization X1 = x1, ...,Xn = xn is observed.
Now, we update the pi j’s using Bayes Theorem as follows: for each pair of indexes i, j we consider the subgraph containing only 1, i, j,n
as nodes, either connected or not, and we ask for the probability of such graph producing the output (X1 = a∗,Xi = xi,X j = x j,Xn = xn),
which will be used as the likelihood of data, and as a prior probability we simply use pi j, so we have
pt+1i j ∝ p(X1 = a
∗,Xi = xi,X j = x j,Xn = xn|subgraph formed by nodes 1,i,j,n)pti j. (10)
Then, we update the model generating a new graph according to pi j. We do not provide an implementation of Equation 10 as it is not in the
scope of this paper.
8 Limitations
We are working within the classical rationality assumption. Rationality can be ultimately thought of as a consistent or coherent way of
making choices, but the precise definition has been a subject of debate. See Ellsberg (1961), Gilboa (2009) and Machina and Siniscalchi
(2014) for critiques of the Savage Rationality Axioms. Another line of decision making, from a descriptive point of view, has been developed
by psychologists and economists; see Tversky and Kahneman (1974); Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 2000).
We are considering Causal Graphical Models as the representation of causal relations in the environment, and we are considering
stochastic causal relations according to the manipulationist interpretation, which is one of many. We have favoured the Causal Graphical
Models over other alternatives since it has been argued that several cognitive processes, such as causal reasoning, can be best represented as
graphical models Danks (2014); Sloman and Lagnado (2015); Hagmayer (2016).
9 Conclusion
We have defined a Causal Decision Problem in terms of a classical Decision Problem under Uncertainty provided of a Causal Mechanism
which controls the relation between actions and outcomes, which is represented by a Causal Graphical Model in this work. In the case
Von Neumann-Morgenstern and Savage Theorems for Causal Decision Making 13
in which a rational decision maker knows such causal relations, Pearl (2009) provides a causal version of the von Neumann-Morgenstern
Theorem for decision making.
On the other hand, when a decision maker does not know the causal mechanism, in Theorem 6 we have provided a causal version
of the Savage Theorem; our result explicitly states how a rational decision maker should use subjective beliefs, encoded as a probability
distribution over causal models, as well as the causal inference machinery within the considered causal structures in order to find an optimal
action.
Using Theorem 6 and taking as a basis Harsanyi’s model of a Bayesian Game in which every player has incomplete information about
both the actions taken by other players as well as the information that made each player take his action we have been able to provide
a definition of a Causal Nash Equilibrium in which every player is aware that there exists a Causal Mechanism that will produce some
consequence once he takes an action. Our decision making result (i.e., Theorem 6), besides motivating the Causal Nash Equilibrium,
also provides an optimality criterion for learning algorithms in causal settings such as those presented in Lattimore et al. (2016); Sen
et al. (2017). Our definition of Causal Equilibrium takes into account classical game theory through the incorporation of the classical von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function as well as the fundamental notion in Causation of Pearl’s do operator.
We consider optimal action selection in a causal environment, providing an extension of the formal criteria (expected utility) to be used
when a causal model is present in the environment. Our results provide a theoretical foundation for previous works that address this problem,
considering a known or partially known causal model. Additionally, we consider the case in which the structure of the causal model is not
known, proposing a novel approach based on Theorem 6, random graphs and the as if intuition.
We are confident that further developments based on our results will show that Causality is a fundamental concept for decision making
under uncertainty.
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